Category: Free Speech

Cline on the Constitution

Cline on the Constitution

While I was on vacation the Supreme Court began to wind down their current term and issue opinions on a few highly anticipated cases.  

As usual there were a few smart opinions and a few stupid ones.  And following the trend over the past decade, a lot of 5-4 votes.  Though there has been some discussion that the split wasn’t always between liberal and conservative, in truth, when it wasn’t split along ideological lines, the Court was invariably punting on the issue by rejecting a case for review or returning it to a lower court for further proceedings.  

Overall there were no major surprises or radical departures from established precedent.  Most of the interesting action was in dissenting opinions both from the Court’s liberal as well as conservative wings. Strong dissenting opinions are often harbingers of the Court’s future direction.  I’ll touch on a few of the more important ones over the next few segments of Cline on the Constitution.

The first case I will review is a Freedom of Speech case. 

Iancu v Brunetti is a prime example of how even Supreme Court Hustices can get twisted up in the bedsheets of their own arcane legalize and leave our society a little less livable. 

The Court ruled that a federal rule barring trademark registration for a line of clothing emblazoned with vulgar words because the words were deemed “immoral or scandalous” resulted in “viewpoint discrimination.” 

One doesn’t have to be a prude to lament how cheap, vulgar, profane and disrespectful major aspects of our society have become.   In college we were all taught to admire the courage of Lenny Bruce and his exploration of the profane.  His legacy? Just take your five-year-old with you to the mall or a ballgame, or just turn on the television any time of the day and be confronted with the most tawdry, shameless, embarrassing language and images. 

The Iancu decision, while not earth-shattering, lays one more stepping stone on the path to the coarsening of America. It’s an example we often see of Justices ignoring the needs of the People they are to serve and of them becoming more Pharisee than wise and prudent arbiters of Law.   

In the Iancu case, a man founded a “clothing line” in which he wanted to print in large letters the word F U C T. 

And, yes, it was meant to be read, as the Supreme Court noted, “as the equivalent of the past participle form of a well-known word of profanity.”   

He was denied a trademark for the use of the term on his products under federal rules passed by Congress which allowed the rejection of trademark registration for terms that were “immoral or scandalous.”  

Justice Sotomayor, like the other justices was aware that their decision would have a negative impact. “The Court’s decision today will beget unfortunate results, with the (rule) struck down as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.  The Government will have no statutory basis to refuse (and thus no choice but to begin) registering marks containing the most vulgar, profane, or obscene words and images imaginable.” 

Justice Breyer says, “While some consumers may be attracted to products labeled with highly vulgar or obscene words, others may believe that such words should not be displayed in public spaces where goods are sold and where children are likely to be present. They may believe that trademark registration of such words could make it more likely that children will be exposed to public displays involving such words.  To that end, the Government may have an interest in protecting the sensibilities of children by barring the registration such words.”

In the majority opinion, however, penned by Justice Elena Kagan, the court focused not on the harm to society, but on a completely hypothetical possibility that to reject F U C T was not about the government drawing the line at trademarking “lewd, sexually explicit or profane,” material which the Court admits it is, but that the term “immoral or scandalous” adopted by Congress may include other, unknown, remote, but possible protected speech. 

While some justices argued for a narrow reading of the word “Scandalous,” the majority, in the most politically correct fashion, could not ignore the use of the word “moral.”

The word “Moral” to them “connoted a preference for rectitude and morality over the opposite.” 

The Court fears if they uphold a rule because it opts for the moral over the immoral, the immoral viewpoint is discriminated against. That, they maintain, is unconstitutional.  

We must, they say, again in the manner of the Pharisees, give the immoral their due. Justice Kagan does the mental gymnastics necessary to argue that “immorality” somehow means all conduct that offends the majority. That is not what it means, and I suspect she knows it. Like the most common of lawyers, she just wishes to win the technical argument.  And, neither she nor the other justices will admit of any responsibility for what their rulings leave the rest of us to face.  

Finding the statue “overbroad” The Court, after detailing a number of hypothetical scenarios not before the Court.  Justice Kagan states,  “There are a great many immoral or scandalous ideas in the world and the (Act) covers them all.  It therefore violates the First Amendment.” 

Okay.  

But does that mean we and our children have to see them on tee shirts protected by the trademark laws of the United States?  

As the guys said on ESPN said, (when it used to be all about sports), upon seeing an unbelievable play on the football or baseball field, “Come on, Man!”   

NY Times Case

NY Times Case

In this week’s segment of Cline on the Constitution I’m once again get distracted by the latest shiny object.  The interruption of my series on voting rights continues so I can discuss Justice Clarence Thomas surprising call for the Supreme Court to reconsider the famous New York Times v. Sullivan case, a case which gutted slander and libel laws. Because President Trump has made similar comments there has been much wailing, rending of garments, and gnashing of teeth over the danger to Freedom of the Press in News Rooms across the land. I’ve written about the subject before. It’s worth revisiting. 

There are some threshold distinctions. 

The Basics:  Slander is the speaking of “base and defamatory words tending to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business, or means of livelihood.” You know, like all the stuff we read on the internet! 

First, slander and libel laws are not about suppressing freedom of speech.  Freedom of Speech has never insulated the right to speak falsely of another.  Slander laws protect against false statements. It is axiomatic that the Truth is an absolute defense to any suit for slander and libel. 

Second, slander and libel are two sides of the same coin.  Libel is merely the written form of slander. 

Third, liability (money damages) attaches to not only the original person who utters the slander, but any person or organization that repeats (re-publicizes) the slander. Therefore, if I falsely accuse you of a crime, not only I am liable for the harm I caused you, but the person who repeats the slander is also liable for damages caused by his republication.

Now for the case.  

The NYTimes case deals with public officials (and public figures, movie stars, athlete’s etc.)

Decided in 1964 (another 60’s case!) it held that false statements published by civil rights groups about an Alabama public official were protected first amendment expressions. It overturned a monetary award made to the public official libeled by the falsehood published by the New York Times. The brand-new rule fashioned by the Supreme Court in the case required public officials to show false statements made about them in the media were not only untrue but were made with malice, that is intentionally or with reckless disregard of their falsity.  (Good movie about this rule:  Absence of Malice with Paul Newman.)

This is a judicially created rule.  It did not exist before 1964.  Somehow the republic survived near 200 years without it.

And it has not been without controversy.  Even among the Justices of the Supreme Court.  Justice Byron White,in a 1974 opinion, criticized the reasoning in the New York Times case and wrote, “First Amendment values are not at all served by circulating false statements of fact about public officials.On the contrary, erroneous information frustrates these values.  They are even more disserved when the statements falsely impugn the honesty of those men and women and hence lessen the confidence in government.”

Justice White also said, “It is difficult to argue that the United States did not have a free and vigorous press beforethe rule in New York Times v Sullivan was announced.” 

There is one further distinction that needs to be made.  

It centers on the use of the phrase “freedom of speech” synonymously with the phrase “freedom of press.”  The first amendment as it relates to speech has two separate clauses (three if you include Assembly, but we will put that aside for now).  

Is Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press actually the same thing?  Or are they two different concepts? 

The contrast in the writings of Justice Potter Stewart and Chief Justice Warren Burger elucidate the distinction.  The difference between Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Speech is that one is institutional, and one is personal.

Justice Stewart noted the Press is the only organized private business given explicit protection by the constitution.  He emphasized the business of the Press, as envisioned by the framers, is more about the dissemination of news than the expressionof ideas.  

Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand stated:

“The Speech Clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express ideas and belief, while the Press Clausefocuses specifically on the liberty to disseminateexpression broadly and comprehends every sort ofpublicationwhich affords a vehicleof information and opinion.”

Chief Justice Burger did not believe the two phrases, Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press were a redundancy.  Rather the Press clause merited special attention in the Bill of Rights because it had historically been the object of official restraints.  The framers especially abhorred the licensing of the Press by the government that was done in the English system.

Which leads us to the final basic questions:  Who is the Press?  And why in the world should they be protected in negligently disseminating false information that hurts someone?

So, who are the Press? The trite image of a news room as a hive of activity manned by sweaty virtuous reporters is no longer true—if it ever was. Modernly, the Press is not just newspapers and T.V., not just periodicals and circulars.  It includes the blogger, the commentator on YouTube, the purveyor of podcasts, Facebook, Instagram, and, of courage, Twitter.  In fact, many reporters from media outlets use each of these platforms to report the news.  It’s easy, it’s fast.  And it is also often wrong.  Plus it is extremely easy to introduce a totally false story into the news stream and have it be picked up and reported, and re-reported, and re-reported ad infinitum, by the mainstream media including the self-same NYTIMES. 

Likewise, it cannot by gainsaid that the Press today are often run by large national, even multi-national corporations.  Editorial polices and stories in most local newsrooms, including our own, are selected and driven by corporate headquarters in Washington, New York, Los Angeles, and Sacramento.  

Which brings us to crux of the matter.  Should these huge corporate entities be held to a standard of due care in putting out false information about people?  Is it ok for them to be negligent?  To damage people with false stories?  Not to have to be careful?  To check something out before publishing it and then having it published and republished forever?  Because the internet is forever.   

Because that is one other difference in modern times.  The republication of false stories on Social Media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and the rest.  Should they not held responsible for vicious lies about real people spread on their platforms?  Because the NYTIMES case eliminated any restraints on their republication of false slander too.  And remember we are talking about information that is demonstrably false.  The truth is an absolute defense to Slander.  

And, you know, it’s not like they can’t afford it.

Reminds one of the auto industry.  Once upon a time that industry felt they could make their Billions on products we had to have and if the product was inferior and dangerous and hurt people because the corporate giants couldn’t be bothered to make cars safe, well, too bad. Fortunately, there were no NYTimes case to Shield them from being held responsible. The laws of liability for their negligence required they change their behavior and be more careful. And they did.

So should News organizations and Social Media platforms be held to a duty of due care before they publish false information?

When one trades in information, just like any other trade, there is a duty to be responsible in making an effort to insure the damaging information is not false. 

The NYTimes case is a judicially created rule.  Times have changed since the 1960s. Justice Thomas’s call for it to be re-considered is prudent and timely.

For more writings by Phil Cline, visit philcline.com

The Cake Baking case

The Cake Baking case

This week’s segment of Cline on the Constitution.

 

“We Reserve the Right to Refuse Service to Anyone.”

 

When Americans think of Civil Rights, they often think of the Constitution.  That is okay.  But it is inaccurate.

 

Our most fundamental rights are enshrined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.  There is, however, a distinction between the Bill of Rights and Civil Rights legislation. The Protections contained in the Bill of Rights are directed against Government Action. Civil Rights laws, on the other hand, regulate Private Conduct.  For example, being denied access to a government building may violate the Bill of Rights.  Being denied accommodations at a privately owned inn or restaurant involves Civil Rights law not the Constitution.

 

Civil Rights laws are not part of the Constitution.  They are laws which, like other laws, are passed by the Congress and State Legislatures or, increasingly, local government entities such as city councils or school boards. And as such, unlike the Bill of Rights they can be changed by the same governmental body that passed the law in the first place.

 

When in conflict with the United States Constitution, Civil Rights laws are invalid.  The reason being because the United States Constitution has a Supremacy clause.  It is the Supreme Law of the land. No federal, state or local ordinance, even if it is in the nature of Civil Rights legislation, may violate the United States Constitution nor a citizen’s rights enshrined in our Bill of Rights.

 

The primary Federal Civil Rights Laws were passed by Congress in 1964.  The authority to pass the laws is based upon the Constitutional grant to Congress of the power to regulate Interstate Commerce.

 

What this means is that if it can be rationally argued that conduct by a private business “affects” Interstate Commerce then Civil Rights laws that regulate the conduct is constitutional.

 

Two examples may help clarify. We all remember that during the civil rights movement, one of the tactics used to end segregation in transportation was to have teams of Black people ride buses throughout the South.   State enforced public-accommodations laws restricting where Blacks were allowed to ride in buses were thereby challenged.  Because the private business of busing could be directly shown to “affect” interstate commerce even if the bus never crossed state lines the Civil Rights legislation prohibiting the discrimination by private bus companies was constitutional. On the other hand, attempts by States to regulate gun possession by enforcing gun free zones near schools could not be justified as “affecting” interstate commerce and were struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of the Second Amendment.

 

Besides the Federal Civil Rights laws, there is a whole other layer of Civil Rights laws which have grown up over the last several decades.  The first level is at the State level.  Though some of the States have long histories of acting to prohibit discrimination, their laws were generally limited to discrimination based on “race, color or previous condition of servitude.”

 

Modernly, there are not only State Civil Rights laws, there are County Civil Rights laws and even City Civil Rights laws.  Almost all are directed toward outlawing discrimination by private businesses against groups of persons.

 

And the list of groups has expanded over the last several decades.

 

Among others, modern civil rights laws address discrimination as applied to race, gender, creed, ethnic origins, religious minorities, sexual orientation, marital status, ancestry, disability, illegitimacy and the newest category, gender identity.

 

The list expands or contracts depending on the jurisdiction.

 

And the frontier is being pushed even further.  California’s legislature is in the process of passing a new Civil Rights law requiring half of all corporate board of directors of private business be women. Of course, if they can require such a quota for women, how long will it be before other groups demand equal representation on corporations doing business in the State?

 

What makes for interesting juxtapositions of this tome of Civil Rights legislation at the state and local level is the Constitution of the United States. Actions to enforce civil rights laws, be it by court or commission, is Government Action and, therefore, if the enforcement action impinges on an individual’s rights under the Bill of Rights, the matter is brought full circle.  The question is joined.  Does the Civil Rights law violate the Constitution?

 

This is where a man by the name of Jack Phillips found himself.  Mr. Phillips owns and operates a bakery. He is a devout Christian.  He operates his business according to Christian principles even if it means forgoing income.  He is closed on Sundays, he pays his employees higher than minimum wage, he gives them loans of money in time of need, he refuses to bake cakes containing alcohol, he refuses to bake cakes with racist or homophobic messages or cakes criticizing God and refuses to bake cakes celebrating Halloween even though Halloween is one of the most lucrative seasons for bakeries.

 

Two men asked him to prepare a wedding cake in celebration of their marriage.  He declined.  He offered to prepare and sell them any other baked goods they desired, including birthday cakes, but to create the cake celebrating a marriage of a same sex couple violated his religious beliefs that marriage is a sacred union between one man and one woman. To create such a cake celebrating the opposite of what he believed, he argued, violated his First Amendment rights, both as to the First Amendment guarantee of the Free Exercise of one’s religion and Freedom of Expression.

 

His argument brought to the fore, two rights that are superior to any state or local civil rights ordinance: Freedom of Religion and Free Speech.

 

The State of Colorado made short shrift of the Mr. Phillip’s religious beliefs and ruled he violated the couple’s rights by not baking the cake. One commissioner went so far as to equate Mr. Phillips refusal to bake a cake to debunked justifications for slavery and the holocaust. He said, “and to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to – to use their religion to hurt others.”

 

The Colorado commission’s reprehensible treatment of Phillips gave Justice Kennedy a gift.

 

Justice Kennedy is the author of the most important gay rights cases of the era, including the Obergefell case banning restrictions on Gay Marriage.

 

And on his way off the court, he needed to find a way to uphold Phillips without endangering the progress in jurisprudence regarding gay rights he had led the way in engendering.

 

In a 7-2 decision written by Kennedy, the court found for Mr. Phillips.  However, as I said in my last blog entry, they essentially punted. They didn’t find that Mr. Phillips rights were violated by requiring he bake the cake or be fined.

 

Rather, in his majority opinion Kennedy found that the Colorado commission’s treatment of Phillips demonstrated an “unconstitutional hostility to his religious beliefs.”  He went on to fashion some new rules, which may or may not survive the test of time.  But he did not address the Free Exercise or Freedom of Speech issues.  He essentially kicked the can on those issues down the road to be decided by a future Supreme Court.

 

As to the Free Exercise clause, the court is walking a tight rope of their own making.  On the one hand, they fear that if they allow people to assert their religious beliefs in denying service to identifiable groups it would undermine all civil rights laws that seek to govern private conduct. A return to the back of the bus as it were. On the other hand, does government get to make the decisions on what is a valid religious belief and tell citizens they are not free to exercise their religion as they choose? The Constitution explicitly says No.

 

What is most interesting about the case and what has not received a lot of public discussion, but which was very much on the minds of many of the Justices as reflected in the concurring opinions penned by Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas is what I believe is a major freedom of expression issue and what the court will have to address in the near future. And that is “Compelled Speech.”  It has import in many areas.  From college campuses enforcing speech codes as if they were “re-education camps” to the large internet companies policing points of view.

 

As applied to the Baker, the court acknowledged that Mr. Phillips considered the cakes he made as works of art.  As such they were “expressive conduct” which is protected under the First Amendment.

 

Additionally, as I outlined in my last blog, requiring speech approved by the government is just as violative of the first amendment as restricting protected speech.

 

For example, the court referenced a previous case in which the Court struck down an ordinance requiring the organizers of a Saint Patrick’s Day parade to include a unit celebrating gays and bisexuals.

 

The court explained that they rejected the notion that governments can mandate thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or indeed all people, as the “antithesis of free speech.” As one of the concurring opinions stated, “One important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may decide what NOT to say and tailor the content of his message as he sees fit.”

 

Colorado attempted to justify requiring the creation of the cake as compelling Phillip’s speech to prevent him from “denigrating the dignity” of same sex couples, “asserting their inferiority” and subjecting them to “humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment.”

 

One justice wrote, “These justifications are completely foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.” He went on to say, “States cannot punish protected speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or undignified.” And further, “it is not the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall be offensive.”

 

The Justice hit the nail on the head when he quoted an earlier case, “If the only reason a public-accommodations law regulates speech is “to produce a society free of biases against protected groups, that purpose is decidedly fatal to the law’s constitutionality, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.”

 

I foresee many other instances where the Bill of Rights is going to come into conflict with the increasingly aggressive use of State and local ordinances to say nothing of school rules designed to stifle unwelcome opinions by requiring a rote declaration of allegiance to principles dictated by those in authority.

 

Ultimately, such laws harm rather help the cause of gay rights as well as other civil rights by oppressing those who may disagree with what we believe.

 

Stay tuned.

 

But about those signs “reserving the right to refuse service to anyone.”?

 

Forget it.

 

For other articles on the Constitution as well as writings by Phil Cline, visit philcline.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Speech Issues on Abortion

Speech Issues on Abortion

This week’s segment of Cline on the Constitution continues the review of major cases decided by the Supreme Court in the last term.

 

The court issued opinions on two cases involving Freedom of Speech and Association.

 

In one case the Court affirmed an important principle regarding Free Speech.  In the other they punted.

 

As to the first case, California’s steady drift toward becoming a complete “Nanny State” resulted in a law directly targeting, appropriately enough, anti-abortion pregnancy Centers.

 

In National Institute etc. v Becerra, operators of Pro-Life clinics challenged a State Law requiring that they post information on how to get no cost state funded abortions. The law compelled these clinics to speak against, indeed advertise, the very thing they abhor. It is rather Kafkaesque to, by force of law, require people to advertise for a state funded procedure that is anathema to their core beliefs on religion, health and morality.

 

And that is aside from the fact we were given yet another law, which assumes a free people, are inept and incompetent. In a state like California where obtaining an abortion is literally free on demand, and the State puts out endless reams of materials about to how and where to get an abortion, the “ninny nannies” in the legislature and Governor’s mansion harbor the inchoate suspicion that a woman who wants one might not be able to figure it out how to get one.

 

The second case is the infamous “Masterpiece Cakeshop” case which presented the issue whether the Court would be willing to uphold a governmental decision that someone’s religious beliefs and practices must be cast aside in service to an ever-increasing alphabet of offended persons who can’t be expected to walk across the street to another merchant to buy a damn wedding cake.  The case centers on the intersection of both Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.  I will have more to say about this case next week.

 

Now, back to the California abortion advertiser case.  In an attempt to uphold the law the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, those legendary masters of legal legerdemain, attempted to invent a new category of speech. They called it “professional speech.”  This new category would give federal courts the means to ignore the usual requirements that “content based” laws that target speech based upon content have to pass strict scrutiny tests.  It would mean government would be free to regulate such speech as they see fit, ban the speech or, like in this case, even require it.

 

The Supreme Court rightly told them there was no such thing as “Professional Speech” and ruled they couldn’t do that.

 

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion, but it was Justice Kennedy who succinctly stated the trenchant issue.

 

“This law is a paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when government seeks to impose its own message in the place of individual speech, thought, and expression.”

 

“For here the State requires primarily pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the State’s own preferred message advertising abortions.”

 

“This compels individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts . . . “

 

The minority opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer worried that the majority’s opinion might lead to challenges of “informed consent” rules and regulations.  For example, by endangering laws requiring medical professionals to give enough information that the person consenting to a procedure is doing so with full knowledge of the risks and benefits.  That, however, is more of a civil liability avoidance procedure than a constitutional principle.

 

The basic Free Speech principle is that if government cannot restrict a person’s freedom of speech, can they require a people to say something they disagree with simply because the government has decided it might be necessary to protect someone it assumes lacks the intelligence or responsibility to get out and get what they want themselves.

 

The opinion rightly points out that if government determines that a message needs to get to out and they have a rational basis for doing so, then, they have a number of way of disseminating the information, including advertising, themselves.  What they can’t do, is required others to communicate that message for them.

 

Lastly, one can be supportive of the landmark Casey case that recognizes a woman’s right to choose to a terminate a pregnancy under certain circumstances without the government unfairly burdening that choice yet be concerned when the government passes laws as it did here.  When it becomes so involved in advocacy of a position that it violates constitutional principles put in place to protect one’s freedom to follow sincerely held beliefs, government has gone where they may not go.

 

For other writings and articles by Phil Cline, visit philcline.com

 

The Slants

The Slants

Simon Tam named his band “The Slants.” The name was intended to be a slur against people of Asian decent. Simon, himself a person of Asian descent, felt that by taking ownership of the derogatory term, he could drain it of its “denigrating force.”

When he applied for a trademark for the name, the Federal Government denied Tam’s request based upon agency rules that prohibited the registration of trademarks that might “disparage . . . or bring . . .into contempt or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.”

Serious football fans know that there is a similar case pending in the federal courts concerning the trademark registration for the Washington Redskins Football team. The same agency suspended the registration of their trademark and the Redskins sued. In a similar vein, the students and alumni of one of our local high schools was affected when the State of California banned the use of the term “Redskins” for public school mascots.

The Supreme Court this week ruled against Political Correctness and Strengthened the case for the Washington Redskins. They held that the Federal Agency violated the Free Speech clause of the Constitution when they denied Tam his trademark.

Some types of speech are less protected than others. For example, Commercial Speech (ads for cars and such) does not have the same protections as Political Speech.

So-called government speech is not protected at all. For example license plates can be regulated as government speech. The court in the Tam case found, however, that Trademarks are private not government speech.

Under the Constitution, the Government may regulate the “time, manner, and place” of speech if the regulation is ‘Viewpoint neutral”. For example the government might be able to ban billboards of a certain size that advertised medical clinics under the rationale they were a distraction to drivers, but they could not ban billboards for medical clinics that performed abortions. Such a rule would not be Viewpoint Neutral.

The Tam case turned on the finding that Offensive speech, however repugnant is a Viewpoint.

The court found that “a fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that the government may not punish or suppress speech based on the disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys.” The government’s denial of a trademark because the government decided the term “Slants” was offensive was not Viewpoint Neutral.

And the fact the though the speaker may not mean to offend, but the audience, nevertheless would be offended is not enough to take the speech outside First Amendment protections. As the court stated: “The Government may not insulate a law from charges of Viewpoint Discrimination by tying censorship to the reaction of the speaker’s Audience.”

This language in the opinion is especially important in these times of rampant political correctness on the campuses of public colleges. When colleges, supported by public funds, seek to impose speech codes, ban certain speakers from campus or commencements, or punish the use of words and speech which college administrators or their minions deem “Hate Speech” they violate the Constitution.

“The danger of Viewpoint Discrimination”, the court opined, “is that the government is attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader debate. The danger is all the greater if the ideas or perspectives are ones a particular audience might think offensive.”

And finally they said, “A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic society.”

The bottom line is that the government attempted to ban a name of a band, the Slants, because the name might have offended a portion of the public. The speaker’s intent and the public’s reaction was irrelevant. The government’s denial of the trademark for the Slants was Viewpoint Discrimination and is prohibited under the First Amendment.

It now appears that if the name the Washington Redskins football team is changed someday because it is deemed offensive, it will be because the owners want it changed. It won’t be because the Government ordered it changed. That is as it should be under the Constitution.

As to local high schools around the state that changed the name of their mascots to conform with politically correct dictates from the State Government, it is unlikely anyone would challenge the law at this point. The constitution requires an actual case or controversy for the Supreme Court to throw out a rule. In those cases, it appears the government’s thought police won and the First Amendment lost.